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Fregna ok segja Den som gjerne
skal fróðra hverr, vil gjelde for klok,
sá er vill heitinn horskr… skal utveksle nytt med andre…
Hávamál Håvamål
In this article, I present a semantic model of modality, where the start-
ing point is the assumption that modality is a semantic category which 
deals with people’s attitude towards the trustworthiness of propositions 
and / or the desirability of states of affairs.
Terminology
In the following, I will simply use the term ‘attitude’ rather than repeat-
ing ‘attitude towards the trustworthiness of propositions and / or 
the desirability of states of affairs’, since these are the only areas I treat 
as modal. In my understanding, modality is not concerned with peo-
ple’s attitude towards other properties, such as good / bad, clever / 
stupid, easy / difficult, big / small, important / insignificant, cheap / 
expensive, and so on. Only trustworthy / untrustworthy (of proposi-
tions) and desirable / undesirable (of states of affairs) are truly modal. 
As a general term, I will use OK-ness, covering both trustworthiness 
and desirability.
As technical terms, I will use epistemic attitude when talking about 
the evaluation of the trustworthiness of a proposition, and non-epistemic 
attitude when talking about the evaluation of the desirability of a state 
of affairs.
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The word epistemic derives from Ancient Greek έπιστήμη meaning 
‘knowledge, science’. However, the epistemic kind of modality deals 
with what is believed to be true rather than what is known to be true. 
This follows from my definition of modality as an attitudinal category, 
and also harmonizes with most other current definitions of ‘epistemic’. 
In this respect, then, the term is somewhat unfortunate. However, it is 
so conventional in the linguistic literature that I do not see any point 
in trying to replace it with a new term.
The speaker may refer to her own or to someone else’s attitude, 
and I will use the term participant which also has become conventional 
in modern linguistic literature on modality. As several authors have 
pointed out (e. g. van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 83; Andersson 2007: 
13f.), it is to be preferred to the alternative term, agent (used by, e. g., 
Bybee et al. 1994), since the person referred to does not necessarily 
have the agent role in an actual utterance – it may also be the patient, 
benefactive or have some other role.
I shall treat attitude as a notion with two values, neutral and posi-
tive. These can be combined with negation to form negative attitude. 
Negative attitude is thus seen as a composite category.
Negation may be treated as a separate feature or factor, which may 
be added to modal expressions in utterances, so that this combination 
expresses the participant’s negative attitude. This is obviously correct 
with respect to the use of modal verbs, such as must, shall, can or will, all 
of which can be combined with the negative particle not. Although there 
exist lexical items, such as scarcely, hardly, prohibited which represent 
the participant’s negative attitude, I choose to analyze the negative atti-
tude as a complex value, resulting from a combination of (non-neutral) 
attitude and negation. Therefore, I will only operate with two types or 
degrees of attitude – positive (non-neutral) and neutral, which partly 
correspond to the traditional terms necessity and possibility, used in most 
literature on modality. However, there are some important differences 
between what is called neutral attitude and possibility, and to an even 
greater extent between positive attitude and necessity, as I will try to 
demonstrate in the following paragraphs.
Neutral attitude means that the speaker has no objections to accept 
a proposition as correct or a state of affairs as worth to occur. However, 
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she may equally accept that the same proposition may turn out to be 
incorrect, or the same state of affairs may turn out not to be worth to 
occur. In either case, no problems (no conflict) will arise for the speaker 
with respect to her beliefs or expectations.
Positive attitude means that the speaker is willing to accept a propo-
sition as correct or a state of affairs as worth to occur. If the proposi-
tion turns out to be incorrect, or the state of affairs turns out not to be 
worth to occur, a conflict arises between the speaker’s beliefs and / or 
expectations and the reality, i. e. there is a problem.
However, the speaker may indicate in the utterance that she admits 
that other attitudes are possible. To put it in other words, the speaker 
may signal that other participants may have different attitudes than 
her own, but this does not mean that the speaker is unsure about her 
own attitude (if this were the case, one would have to do with neutral 
attitude, cf. above).
As technical terms, I will use simple and complex attitude to dis-
tinguish between cases where the speaker in her utterance expresses 
only her own positive (non-neutral) attitude without approving of any 
alternative attitudes, and cases where she expresses her own positive 
attitude at the same time as she signals in the same utterance that other 
participants may have a different attitude towards the status of the atti-
tude target, i. e., the proposition or the state of affairs in question.
The distinction between simple and complex attitude is only rele-
vant in connection to non-neutral attitude. Neutral attitude is automati-
cally simple since the speaker does not – and cannot – invite anyone to a 
discussion or to negotiations about the trustworthiness of a proposition 
or about the desirability of a state of affairs. Such discussion or negotia-
tions are only possible when the speaker has a non-neutral attitude and 
is willing to listen to alternative attitude(s).
In practice, the complex attitude may be perceived as a lower 
degree of commitment on the part of the speaker toward the attitude 
target, as compared with the simple attitude which sounds more cat-
egorical and uncompromising. Thus, the complex attitude can easily be 
interpreted as containing a certain element of doubt or non-assuredness 
and consequently as representing lesser confidence from the side of 
the speaker. However, the speaker does not actually need to be unsure 
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about her own attitude in order to be able / willing to allow the other 
participant(s) to express their (alternative) attitude.1
As to terminology, traditional terms in the literature on modality 
are necessity and possibility. However, there are reasons to avoid using 
them in the description of my model of modality. It would not be logi-
cal to distinguish between simple (non-negotiable) vs. complex (negoti-
able) necessity, as the term necessity refers to something absolute and 
undisputable. The distinction between something the speaker agrees 
to dispute and something she does not, is an essential part of my model 
of the semantics of modality. Therefore I stick to the use of the terms 
neutral and positive attitude in preference to possibility and necessity.
Actually, many authors have operated with terms like strong vs. 
weak obligation and tentative vs. confident conclusion, which point in 
the direction that modality is treated as a gradable domain or even as a 
continuum (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 82; van der Auwera et al. 
2005: 251–252). But since it is not logical to talk about strong (confident) 
necessity / possibility as opposed to weak (tentative) necessity / pos-
sibility, the terminology gets unnecessarily complicated. To my mind, 
the cleaner the terminology is, the more adequate the analysis one 
can achieve. I choose therefore to abandon the traditional distinction 
between necessity and possibility, in favour of talking about different 
types of attitude and complexity, which are represented in figure 1 
below.
 1 As an alternative set of terms for the description of this distinction between 
the different types of non-neutral attitudes, I have considered negotiable vs. 
non-negotiable attitude. These terms also represent the idea of the speaker’s 
willingness (or unwillingness) to accept alternative attitudes. There is however 
some risk that the reader will misinterpret these terms as necessarily invoking 
some actual negotiations between the speaker and the other participant(s) in 
a concrete communication situation. The idea here is actually that the speak-
er may signal her readiness or willingness to accept alternative attitudes in 
the very same utterance where she expresses her own attitude. Nothing is said 
about whether any actual negotiations between two or several participants 
will ever take place. Therefore, I have finally chosen to use the terms simple vs. 
complex attitude throughout the article; of course, the adjective “simple” has 
here nothing to do with “simple-minded”, “simplistic” or “naïve (attitude)”.
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attitude neutral positive
complexity simple complex
Figure 1. Types of attitude and complexity.
As already mentioned above, the term attitude is used in connection 
with the speaker’s evaluation of the trustworthiness of propositions 
(epistemic attitude) and her evaluation of the desirability of a state of 
affairs to occur (non-epistemic attitude). When there is no need to 
specify whether epistemic or non-epistemic attitude is meant, I use 
the term OK-ness which covers both trustworthiness and desirability. 
This leads to the preliminary representation of modal domains given 
in figure 2.
Non-epistemic attitudes
(evaluation of desirability of states 
of affairs)
Epistemic attitudes
(evaluation of trustworthiness 
of propositions)
Complex positive attitude
(in the speaker’s view it is OK 
only if the state of affairs occurs, 
but the speaker signals in the same 
utterance that there is room for 
alternative attitudes)
Complex positive attitude
(in the speaker’s view it is OK only 
if the proposition turns out to be 
correct, but the speaker signals in 
the same utterance that there is 
room for alternative attitudes)
Simple positive attitude
(only OK if the state of affairs occurs)
Simple positive attitude
(only OK if the proposition turns 
out to be correct)
Neutral attitude
(OK if the state of affairs occurs, 
but also OK if it does not)
Neutral attitude
(OK if the proposition turns out to 
be correct, but also OK if it does not)
Figure 2. A preliminary representation of modal domains.
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In the following sections I will discuss the different types of atti-
tude in the epistemic and non-epistemic domain in greater detail and 
provide examples that may serve as empirical evidence that my model 
of modality is not only based on theoretical considerations, but also 
represents linguistic reality well.
Finally, I would like to mention that I have chosen to use the pro-
noun ‘she’ when referring to the speaker, and ‘he’ when referring to 
the hearer or other participant(s) in a communication situation.
Non-epistemic modality
Strictly speaking, modality refers to the attitude in both epistemic and 
non-epistemic modality. In the case of non-epistemic modality, the atti-
tude is pragmatically connected with expectations about the participants’ 
actions and therefore with certain speech acts. This is, in principle, a sec-
ondary effect. These speech acts are determined not only by modality 
itself, but also by the communication situation, which in its turn is 
primarily determined by the (number of) participants involved. Non-
epistemic modality differs from epistemic modality in that it is connect-
ed with reactions and / or actions, besides describing the participants’ 
attitude. Epistemic modality is only connected with the participant’s 
attitude towards the OK-ness of a proposition or a state of affairs.
In the traditional literature on non-epistemic (specifically deontic) 
modality, one usually speaks about permission and different types 
of so-called mands (commands, demands, encouragements, requests, 
entreaties), which are called non-epistemic (deontic) possibility and 
non-epistemic (deontic) necessity, respectively. In my view, permis-
sion, encouragement or command are not different (sub)types of non-
epistemic modality, but rather different types of speech acts, the use of 
which depend both on the speaker’s (or some other person’s) attitude 
and on the communication situation.
The neutral attitude in connection with non-epistemic modality 
(non-epistemic attitude) carries the meaning that, in the participant’s 
view, there are no obstacles for the state of affairs to occur – it is OK 
that the state of affairs occurs, but it is also OK if it does not occur. 
The reason for why it is OK that a state of affairs occurs does not need 
to be expressed in an utterance. Thus, the reason is actually not relevant 
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for the identification of the attitude as neutral. This is not to say that 
the reason is of no relevance for the choice of lexemes in concrete 
utterances, as we will see in the examples below.
The non-neutral attitude in connection with non-epistemic modal-
ity means that, in the participant’s view, matters are OK only if the state 
of affairs occurs. If the state of affairs fails to occur, there is a conflict 
between the participant’s expectations or interests and reality.
An utterance may, of course, contain certain information about 
the obstacles for a state of affairs to occur. Likewise, one can state that 
no obstacles are present in a given situation. The speaker may for exam-
ple indicate that there is no prohibition (either by the speaker herself 
or by law) or that there are no physical, material obstacles for the state 
of affairs to occur. An utterance may also contain information about 
reasons for why it is important to ensure that a state of affairs does not 
fail to occur. Such information may be explicitly expressed by lexical 
means, but may also be indicated by the speaker’s choice of modal verb. 
A typical example from Modern Norwegian is the use of the modal verb 
får in utterances expressing permission.
Du får gå nå (= you may go now, you are permitted to go now) 
differs from Du kan gå nå (= you can go now) in terms of explicitness 
regarding the obstacles. The latter utterance simply indicates that there 
are no obstacles for the participant to leave (without indicating what 
kind of obstacles could prevent him from being able to do so), while 
the former indicates that there is no prohibition (= the obstacle) to 
leave. By using the verb får, the speaker thus grants her own permission 
or refers to someone else’s permission for the participant to leave.
Another typical example is the use of the modal verb skal in utter-
ances expressing command, with 2nd person subject. Du skal gå nå 
(= you are obliged to go now, you are commanded to go now) differs 
from Du må gå nå (= you must go now) in that the latter utterance 
more neutrally indicates that the participant is forced to leave (one 
does not indicate what kind of circumstances force him to do so), while 
the former indicates that it is someone’s will (= the obstacle) which 
requires that the participant leaves.
A similar difference may be observed between utterances contain-
ing the modal verb bør as compared to utterances containing the modal 
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verbs skal or må. Du bør gå nå (= you ought to go now) means that, in 
the speaker’s view, it is in the other participant’s own interests that he 
goes now. By such an utterance, the speaker sends a signal that other 
people may have different attitudes towards whether the matters really 
only are OK provided that the person in question goes now. In practice, 
such an utterance may be interpreted as expressing a lower degree of 
confidence on the part of the speaker regarding what her own attitude 
actually is. Both Du skal gå nå (= you are obliged to go now, you are 
commanded to go now) and Du må gå nå (= you must go now) disal-
low any other points of view towards the OK-ness of the matters and 
consequently can be interpreted as expressing a higher degree of con-
fidence on behalf of the speaker.
As already mentioned, in the traditional literature on modality one 
usually speaks about different (sub)types of non-epistemic modality, 
depending on the nature of the obstacles. The most established notions 
are participant-external vs. participant-internal modality, and dynamic, 
deontic and boulomaic (boulethic) modality. In my view all of these 
notions refer to different communication situations, rather than con-
stituting different types of modality. By communication situation, I 
mean first of all the number of participants involved in a conversation. 
This determines the nature of the speech (monologue or dialogue), and 
allows for variation regarding the source of attitude, that is, the person 
whose attitude is being reported. The speaker does not necessarily 
report her own attitude.
By separating modality, which deals with the attitude, from infor-
mation about the kinds of obstacles or reasons behind the attitude, we 
are able to avoid the major problem with the traditional interpretation 
of modality, namely, the difficulty of proving that all the different sub-
types are actually parts of the same linguistic category. In other words, 
we avoid the difficulties by formulating a definition of modality which 
is equally well suited for all the subtypes of modality, and at the same 
time excludes other categories, such as tense or aspect.
The neutral attitude in connection with non-epistemic modality, 
as has already been pointed out, may be paraphrased as no obstacle for 
a state of affairs to occur, or it is OK if a state of affairs occurs (but also 
OK if it does not).
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The positive (non-neutral) attitude in connection with non-epis-
temic modality may be paraphrased as the matters are OK if – and only if – 
a state of affairs occurs, but the speaker may signal that it is “allowed” for 
other people to have different attitudes towards the same state of affairs. 
Such a “democratic” attitude may be expressed explicitly by lexical 
means or by the choice of modal auxiliary in a concrete utterance.
Let us now take a look at different types of attitude in connec-
tion to non-epistemic modality. If the speaker holds that there are no 
obstacles for a state of affairs to occur, she may say a sentence like one 
of the following.
1. Neutral attitude in connection to non-epistemic modality
 a) Du kan reise til Paris.
‘You can go to Paris.’
 b) Du får reise til Paris.
‘You may (are allowed to) go to Paris.’
 c) Du må gjerne reise til Paris.
‘It is fine with me if you go to Paris.’
 d) Bare reis til Paris, du!
‘Just go to Paris!’
All these utterances may be paraphrased as It is OK if you go to Paris 
(but also OK if you don’t). The utterance in (1a) is the most unspecified 
one in the sense that it simply states the absence of obstacles for the state 
of affairs to occur, saying nothing about the nature of the obstacles. (1b) 
expresses permission, that is, absence of prohibition, which constitutes 
information about the obstacle. (1c) and (1d) sound most natural in 
situations where the speaker reacts to the other participant’s attitude, 
that is, where the other participant has shown his own non-neutral 
attitude towards the state of affairs (in this case, willingness to go to 
Paris) and the speaker is now giving her approval.
If the speaker considers that matters are OK only if the state of 
affairs occurs, she may use an utterance like one of these.
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2. Positive (non-neutral) attitude in connection to non-epistemic modality
simple attitude
 a) Du må reise til Paris.
‘You must go to Paris.’
 b) Du skal reise til Paris.
‘You shall go to Paris.’
 c) Du vil reise til Paris, altså.
‘So, you will (= want, wish) to go to Paris.’
 d) Reis til Paris!
‘Go to Paris!’
complex attitude
 e) Du bør / burde / skulle reise til Paris.
‘You ought to / should go to Paris.’ = It is desirable with respect to 
your own interests that you go to Paris (it is not OK for yourself 
unless you go to Paris).
All these utterances may be paraphrased as It is OK if, and only if, 
you go to Paris = It is not OK unless you go to Paris.
The utterance in (2a) is the most unspecified one in the sense 
that it only shows the speaker’s attitude towards the state of affairs, 
namely, that the participant must leave for Paris in order for matters 
to be (become / stay) OK. Nothing is said about the reasons for why 
it has to be so.
The utterance in (2b) means that someone has planned the partici-
pant’s journey to Paris. This utterance thus contains information about 
the nature of the obstacle.
The utterance in (2c) means that the reason for why it is necessary 
to go to Paris, is the participant’s own will.
The utterance in (2d) is a command and will typically be used in 
situations where the speaker has authority to decide what is desirable 
and what is not.
The utterance in (2e) differs from the utterances in (2a–d) in that 
it signals that the speaker dissociates herself from being the only licit 
source of norm: the decision to go to Paris or not rests with the other 
participant himself. Thus, the speaker expresses her point of view quite 
unambiguously, but at the same time (and in the same utterance) she 
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indicates that the other participant(s) can have different attitudes. In 
the traditional literature on modality such utterances are said to express 
weak obligation, but in my view it is more precise to analyze them as 
representing the speaker’s complex attitude towards the state of affairs. 
To put it in other words, the speaker does not express that, in her view, 
it is less necessary for the other participant to go Paris by choosing 
the auxiliary bør (ought to) instead of må (must) or skal (shall). What 
the speaker does say, is that she is not expressing the only possible 
attitude towards the necessity of the journey to Paris.
Thus, the choice of a modal verb in a concrete utterance may reflect 
considerations which are primarily related to the identity of the source 
of attitude and the complexity of the attitude (simple or complex). 
The consequence of the pragmatic interpretation of these considera-
tions is assigning the utterances in (2a–e) different degrees of OK-ness 
of the state of affairs.
The source of modality need not be expressed in an utterance. 
If we only have an utterance like Du må reise til Paris, and no additional 
information, we can say that the attitude is non-neutral and simple, but 
the source of attitude is unspecified.
Optative is another example where the source of attitude remains 
unspecified.
3. Unspecified source of modality, optative
 a) Leve kongen!
‘Long live the king!’
 b) Må kongen leve lenge!
‘May the king live long!’
The attitude represented by such utterances is non-neutral and simple.
In my model, then, non-epistemic modality partly overlaps with 
what has traditionally been called boulomaic (boulethic) modality, 
deontic modality and dynamic modality, or, in terms elaborated by van 
der Auwera and Plungian (1998), participant-external and participant-
internal modality. The non-epistemic modality also covers wishes and 




As mentioned, epistemic modality is pure attitude, in my view. Unlike 
non-epistemic modality, it does not require any reaction and does not 
involve any actions from the side of the participants of the communi-
cation situation. The speaker expresses (her own or someone else’s) 
attitude towards the trustworthiness (likelihood) of a proposition. As 
in the case with non-epistemic modality, one can speak of the source 
of attitude here, as well. The speaker is identical with the source of 
modality when she expresses her own attitude, and not identical with 
the source of modality when she refers to someone else’s attitude.2 
The source of modality can also remain unspecified.
The neutral attitude in connection with epistemic modality simply 
means that the participant has no reason to believe that the proposi-
tion is wrong or false; there is no obstacle to accept the proposition as 
potentially true. It does not say anything about whether the participant 
expects the proposition to be true or not; it says only that it may well 
be true (but may also be false).
The most typical means of expressing the neutral attitude in 
English are utterances containing modal verbs can and may, while in 
Norwegian it is utterances with the modal verb kan. Such utterances 
can usually be paraphrased by It is possible that…, It is possibly the case 
that…, or, to include the notion of obstacle, by There is no obstacle 
to assuming that the following proposition is true (although it may also 
be false).
4. Neutral attitude in connection with epistemic modality
Han kan ha reist til Paris.
‘He can have left for Paris.’ = It is possible that he has left for Paris. 
= There is no obstacle to assuming that he has left for Paris.
The positive (non-neutral) attitude in connection with epistemic 
modality means that the participant has essential willingness (not rea-
son – although willingness may be invoked by some reason, it may also 
remain unmotivated) to believe that the proposition is correct; or, to 
 2 Reporting someone else’s words is usually considered a kind of evidentiality.
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employ the notion of obstacle, the participant will encounter obstacles 
to accepting any other conclusion than the proposition being correct. 
The nature of the obstacle does not need to be expressed in the proposi-
tion, but if it is expressed, it may be related to knowledge, information, 
reasonable thinking or simply the participant’s belief.
5. Positive (non-neutral) attitude in connection with epistemic modality
 a) Han må ha reist til Paris.
‘He must have left for Paris.’ = It is not OK for me to believe anything 
else than that he has left for Paris.
 b) Han vil ha reist til Paris.
‘He will have left for Paris.’ = It is not OK for me to believe anything 
else than that he has left for Paris.
The utterance in (5a, b) represents simple attitude, which is to 
say that the speaker is not accepting any other attitude besides that 
the proposition Han er reist til Paris ‘He has left for Paris’ is correct. 
The difference between (5a) and (5b) is not related to the attitude 
as such. The utterance in (5a) may be characterized as a deduction, 
while (5b) may be characterized as a prediction. In other words, by 
choosing the modal verb må the speaker signals that she has some kind 
of evidence to base her conclusion on. By contrast, the modal verb vil 
is chosen when the speaker predicts something without necessarily 
having any evidence (or when she refers to something that is known 
commonly). Thus, the choice of the modal verb provides more infor-
mation than barely the speaker’s attitude sensu stricto.
As in the domain of non-epistemic modality, the speaker may also 
possess a complex attitude, as is demonstrated by the utterances in (6).
6. Complex attitude in connection with epistemic modality
De bør ha reist til Paris.
‘They ought to have left for Paris.’
Complex attitude means that the speaker considers the proposi-
tions in (6) to be correct, but at the same time she signals that different 
points of view may be accepted as well. In practice such utterances as 
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in (6) may be interpreted as representing a lower degree of confidence 
(certainty) compared to the utterance in (5a, b).
The use of modal verbs such as kan, bør, vil, må does not in itself 
contain information about the reasons to believe that the proposition 
is true (or the nature of obstacles to reject it), other than what has 
been said about the difference between deduction (expressed by må) 
and prediction (expressed by vil). The situation is somewhat different 
when the modal verb skal is used, as discussed below in the subsection 
on evidentiality.
Dynamic modality and evidentiality – modal or just 
modality-related domains?
In this section, I will briefly discuss the status of dynamic modality and 
evidentiality in relation to my model of the semantics of modality.
Dynamic modality
Dynamic modality is usually defined as dealing with a participant’s 
ability and, according to some authors, willingness to perform actions 
or get involved in states of affairs.
Examples of these subtypes of dynamic modality would be utter-
ances like (7) and (8).
7. Ability
Han kan spille piano.
‘He can (is able to, knows how to) play the piano.’
8. Willingness
Han vil spille piano.
‘He will (wants to, is willing to) play the piano.’
Some authors extend the notion to also cover enabling condi-
tions that are external to the participant(s). This type of modality is 
sometimes called circumstantial modality or circumstantial possibility. 
It may be exemplified by the utterance in (9).
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9. Circumstantial possibility
Man kan spille piano der (det fins nemlig et piano der borte).
‘One can play piano there (there is in fact a piano available over there).’
As already mentioned, I have chosen to define modality as an atti-
tudinal category, and by attitude I mean people’s evaluation of the trust-
worthiness of propositions or the desirability of states of affairs to occur. 
So the question is how dynamic and circumstantial modality fits into 
my model of modality.
The status of willingness seems to cause no problems. Willingness 
is a kind of positive attitude, and therefore utterances expressing will-
ingness are treated as modal. In my model, willingness is a kind of 
non-epistemic modality.
The status of ability and circumstantial possibility is less clear. If abil-
ity is taken to mean nothing else but a person’s mental or physical powers, 
it falls outside the range of what can be called modal (= attitudinal) mean-
ings. However, the Norwegian verb KUNNE often is used to signal that it 
is OK if a state of affairs occurs or if a proposition turns out to be true with-
out specifying why it is OK. Or, to put it in other words, the verb KUNNE 
is often used to express that there is no obstacle for a state of affairs to 
occur or for a proposition to be true. Since there is no obstacle, the speaker 
does not need to say anything about the nature of the obstacle(s) which 
might potentially prevent the state of affairs from occurring or rule out 
the chances that the proposition could be true. The utterance in (7) 
Han kan spille piano ‘He can play the piano’ may be interpreted as mean-
ing ‘He agrees (is not unwilling, has nothing against) playing the piano’, as 
well as ‘He is able, knows how to play the piano’ – and ‘He may be playing 
the piano’. It is impossible to tell which of the interpretations was intended 
by the speaker unless additional information is provided. This is not to 
say that there is no difference between the three interpretations, or that it 
is impossible to tell them apart in principle. The speaker may make clear 
which of the interpretations she intends by lexical means, but she also 
may fail to provide any additional information and in so doing leave it for 
the hearer to choose which one of the interpretations he prefers. The fact 
that a person knows how to play a piano does neither require him to be 
agreeable nor prevent him from being agreeable to play a piano. There 
132 Ugnius Mikučionis
is no automatism in the relationship between ability and agreeability 
(positive attitude). So, it is clear that the two interpretations are distinct 
in principle. The one of them (ability) is not related to attitude sensu 
stricto, while the other one (agreeability) clearly is. Ability and agree-
ability may, but do not need to, coincide. Therefore it seems reasonable 
to claim that the ability-reading and the agreeability-reading of the verb 
KUNNE belong to different squares on a figure representing the seman-
tics of the Norwegian modal verbs rather than to the same square. But 
those squares must be adjacent to each other, since the speaker can fail 
to indicate the boundary between them. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, 
for the relationship between epistemic and dynamic modality.
The relationship between circumstantial modality and non-epistemic 
modality (attitude) is of the same kind. The utterance in (9) above, Man 
kan spille piano der (det fins nemlig et piano der borte) ‘One can play piano 
there (there is in fact a piano available over there)’, will unambiguously be 
interpreted by the hearer as an example of circumstantial modality only 
if the remark about availability of a piano is included. This interpretation 
involves no attitude. Without additional information the utterance Man 
kan spille piano der ‘One can play piano there’ may also be interpreted as 
expressing someone’s permission, i. e. attitude. Availability of a piano and 
someone’s permission may, but do not need to, coincide. The speaker 
may say explicitly whether she speaks about the availability of necessary 
resources or about authorities’ permission. But she may choose just to 
say that there is no obstacle for playing a piano, leaving it for the hearer 
to decide which one or both of the interpretations he chooses.
Thus, it may be argued that the difference between neutral atti-
tude on the one hand, and absence of (physical, material or any type 
of) obstacles on the other hand, is linguistically irrelevant, at least in 
the standard bokmål variety of the Norwegian language. By linguisti-
cally irrelevant I mean that the speaker does not necessarily need to 
express her choice vis-à-vis the mentioned difference.
Returning to the question about the position of dynamic (and circum-
stantial) modality in my model, it seems reasonable to claim that dynamic 
(and circumstantial) modality is connected to epistemic and non-epistemic 
modality via underspecification. The attitudinal and non-attitudinal mean-
ings of the verb KUNNE are clearly distinct, and the speaker may express 
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explicitly which of the meanings she intends. But the speaker may choose 
to fail to draw the boundary between attitudinal and non-attitudinal mean-
ings, leaving it to the hearer to choose between interpretations.
Evidentiality
The modal verb skal is not only used to express the participant’s attitude. 
It is also frequently used in utterances where the speaker refers to some-
one else’s words. That usage represents one of the so-called evidential 
meanings. Thus, by uttering Han skal ha reist til Paris ‘He “shall” have 
left for Paris’, the speaker indicates that it is someone else that claims 
that the proposition Han har reist til Paris ‘He has left for Paris’ is true. 
The degree of the speaker’s own commitment to the proposition is not 
unambiguously shown by the modal verb in this case. Of course, it may 
also be shown by some other means of expression. The speaker who 
refers to someone else’s words may also want to express to what degree 
she herself is committed to the trustworthiness of the proposition, but 
in such a case she must choose some other means of expression. It seems 
that it would be “too much work” for an auxiliary verb to indicate both 
the source of information and the degree of trustworthiness.
In a sentence which contains both the information that the speaker 
is reporting someone else’s words and information about the degree of 
trustworthiness, one has to employ two means of expression.
10. Reported proposition and degree of trustworthiness
 a) Indirect knowledge is indicated by a lexical expression (Hun sier), 
and attitude towards the trustworthiness of the proposition is indi-
cated by the choice of the modal verb.
Hun sier at han kan / bør / vil / må ha reist til Paris.
‘She says that he may / ought to / will / must have left for Paris.’
 b) Indirect knowledge is indicated by means of the evidential verb skal, 
while attitude towards the trustworthiness of the proposition is indi-
cated by a lexical expression.
Han skal ha reist til Paris, men det tror jeg ikke noe på.
‘He is said to have left for Paris, but I don’t believe this is correct.’
Han skal ha reist til Paris, og det kan godt stemme.
‘He is said to have left for Paris, and this may well be the case.’
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Evidential skal is thus not related – not directly, at least, – to 
the speaker’s own attitude towards the trustworthiness of the propo-
sition. However, the preterite form skulle may be used to indicate a 
lower degree of the speaker’s commitment to the trustworthiness of 
the proposition than the present tense form skal. Consider the two 
sentences in (11).
11. Evidentiality and degree of trustworthiness
 a) Han skal ha reist til Paris.
‘He is said to have left for Paris’ (and I say nothing about the level of 
trustworthiness)
 b) Han skulle ha reist til Paris.
‘He is said to have left for Paris’ (and I see this information as less 
trustworthy)
The difference between skal and skulle can most probably be 
accounted for from a diachronic point of view, treating the form skulle 
as subjunctive of the verb SKULLE. In Modern Norwegian, however, 
there seem to be no grammaticalised means to express both the fact that 
information is reported and the degree of the speaker’s commitment 
to the trustworthiness of this information.
In the traditional literature on modality, reported information is 
treated as a type of evidentiality, but there is no consensus as to whether 
evidentiality is to be included into the domain of epistemic modality or 
if it should be considered as a separate, though adjacent, domain.
Since modality is defined as an attitudinal category, that is, a cate-
gory dealing with the people’s attitudes towards propositions or states 
of affairs, the question about the source of information is irrelevant, 
so to speak, for the decision whether a category is modal or not. A cru-
cial question, however, is whether the category in question describes 
some participant’s attitude towards the validity of a proposition, or not. 
In such a perspective, evidentiality should only be treated as a modal 
category to the extent that it involves an evaluation of the OK-ness of 
a proposition.
These considerations point in the direction of evidentiality being a 
non-modal domain, in principle. This interpretation is also supported 
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by the fact that a feature “reported” may, but does not need to, be com-
bined with information about the obstacles to accept a proposition as 
true / false – it follows from there that evidentiality and modality are 
two different categories.
Conclusion
To sum up the proposal above, we can represent the different types of 
modality as in figure 3.
A rough overview of the uses of modern Norwegian modal verbs 
in terms of the proposed model is given in figure 4 (see page 136).
The real picture is further complicated by pragmatic considerations, 
such as the use of kan / kunne in imperative utterances with a certain 
amount of politeness or, on the contrary, irony and impatience. Such 
utterances deserve a more detailed discussion (cf. Mikučionis 2009). 
Another important aspect of the use of the Norwegian modal verbs is 
preterite (past tense) forms, used non-temporally. They have not been 








not OK unless a state 
of affairs occurs (but 
there is room for 
alternative attitudes)
not OK unless a 
proposition is true 




not OK unless a state 
of affairs occurs




OK if a state of affairs 
occurs (but also OK 
if it does not occur)
OK if a proposition 
is true (but also OK 
if it is false)
Figure 3. Overview of the types of modality.
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source of attitude), 
skal (personal or 
institutional source of 
attitude), får (approx. 







source of attitude), 
får (“is allowed”), 
må (in connection 
with gjerne / bare)
kan, kunne
kan (dynamic / circumstantial meanings)
Figure 4. Uses of modern Norwegian modal verbs.
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